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TRANSNATIONAL MARKET GOVERNANCE
AND ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP:
NEW FRONTIERS FOR FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY
Mary Condon & Lisa Philipps*

INTRODUCTION
Many states have embraced, in various intensities, the
dogma of neoliberalism,1 using it as the touchstone for policy
prescriptions ranging from the sale of state assets, the removal or
reduction of welfare benefits, or even more radical structural
adjustment programs. In our earlier work, we have charted the
gendered implications of such doctrines for domestic
policymaking and law in Canada,2 and other scholars have
canvassed these themes in relation to Canada and elsewhere.'
* Associate Professors, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
(Toronto, Ontario). The authors thank Zara Merali and Kenneth Younie for
their excellent research assistance in the preparation of this paper. We also
thank the organizers of the 2005 Women and the Law Conference at Thomas
Jefferson School of Law, especially Susan Bisom-Rapp, Martha Fineman and
Linda Keller, for the opportunity to participate and develop our ideas at this
superb academic event.
1. Political economist Isabella Bakker defines the major premises of
neoliberalism as follows: "First, that the forms of institutions such as the state
and market should reflect the motivation of individual self-interest. Second,
that states should provide only a minimum of public goods, along the lines of
the 19th-century 'nightwatchman' model .... And third, that the most efficient
allocation of resources and maximization of utility occurs through markets."
Isabella Bakker, Neoliberal Governance and the New Gender Order, in 1
WORKING PAPERS 49-59 (1999). See also Stephen Gill, Globalization, Market
Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism, 3 MILLENIUM 24 (1995);
NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah
Johnston eds., 2005).
2. See Mary Condon, PrivatizingPension Risk: Gender, Law and Financial
Markets, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM (Brenda
Cossman & Judy Fudge eds., 2002); Lisa Philipps, Tax Law and Social
Reproduction: The Gender of Fiscal Policy in an Age of Privatization, in
PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM (Brenda Cossman &
Judy Fudge eds., 2002).
3. See JANINE BRODIE, POLITICS ON THE MARGINS: RESTRUCTURING AND
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The assumption underlying our previous work was that
neoliberal philosophy delegitimizes the project of "social
citizenship," in which the nation-state is assigned a central role
in providing baseline economic security to all members of
society.4 Neoliberalism instead privileges markets as the
superior distributive mechanism for goods and services and it
rests on a heightened responsibility imposed on individuals to
manage their own welfare and well-being. We argued that all of
this was very problematic from a gender point of view, creating
increased economic disadvantage for many women and
rendering much social policy immune to democratic
accountability because it was being accomplished increasingly by
way of market mechanisms.' While feminist analysts have
engaged vigorously with this development by uncovering the
discriminatory effects of neoliberal policies in various state
domestic contexts, less work has been done on the gendered
implications of neoliberalism in the context of transnational
economic governance, much of which takes place outside formal
state institutions. This paper seeks to make a contribution to
that task.
Specifically, we consider the possibilities for progressive
resistance to the mantras of neoliberalism with its attendant
policy implications in the international realm. In particular, we
assess the capabilities of two interrelated frameworks, that of
feminist legal theory on the one hand, and economic citizenship
on the other, in providing the analytical tools for a response to
neoliberalism as the dominant discourse shaping the governance
of economies. This endeavor obviously requires some staking
out of the intellectual ground we wish to till. Accordingly, we
CANADIAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1995); Martha T. McCluskey,
Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the
Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003); KERRY RITriCH, RECHARACTERIZING
THE

RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION, AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM

(Kluwer Law International, 2002); Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Face of
Employment Discrimination, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS:
GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY (Martha Fineman ed., 2005) [hereinafter
Fineman]. For more general discussions of the meaning and development of
neoliberalism, see Janine Brodie, Meso-Discourses, State Forms and the
Genderingof Liberal-DemocraticCitizenship, 1 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 223 (1997).
4. The evolution of social citizenship and critiques of this concept are
discussed in more detail below, in the text accompanying notes 30-47.
5. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004).
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will first consider the significant strengths and some limitations
of feminist legal theory as a lens for studying markets and
economies generally, so as to assess its potential for providing
insights into the realm of transnational economic governance.
We will then move to consider the evolving discourse of
"economic citizenship" and citizenship more generally as a
further pole of analysis, while interrogating the extent to which
the discourse of economic citizenship might itself be gendered.
Finally we make some tentative suggestions about how feminist
legal theorists might begin to apply these insights by examining
two disparate sites of transnational economic governance,
involving international standard setting in the areas of mutual
fund regulation and fiscal policy reform. Ultimately the goal is
to build the capacities of feminist legal theory as a framework
for critical analysis of economic and market processes.
I. A FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TOOLKIT FOR
THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Feminist legal theory is less thoroughly developed in
relation to market processes and forms of governance than in
relation to other areas such as reproductive rights, family
relations, and constitutional equality rights.6
A notable
exception to the relatively limited attention to market processes,
of course, is the sophisticated feminist literature analyzing labor
markets and their regulation.7 However, there are at least three
enduring insights of feminist legal theory that could be used to
lay the groundwork for a broader analysis of the international
economic realm.

6. A recent effort to close this gap includes Fineman, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Judy Fudge, From Segregation to Privatization: Equality, the
Law, and Women Public Servants, 1908-2001, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE
CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM, supra note 2; LEAH F. VOSKO, TEMPORARY WORK:
THE GENDERED RISE OF A PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (2000);
Kathryn Abrams, The Global Impact of Feminist Legal Theory, 28 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. _ (2005); Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Face of
Employment Discrimination, in Fineman, supra note 3; Kerry Rittich,
Feminization and Contingency: Regulating the Stakes of Work for Women, in
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds.,
2002); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW (Anne Morris &

Therese O'Donnell eds., 2000);

JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY

WORK AND FAMILY CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT

(2000).
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The first is its nuanced analysis of how the domain of the
"private" is constructed through law. Feminist legal theory has
been invaluable in exposing the incoherence, fungibility, and
political effects of the attempt to draw a line between the
"public" and the "private" realms and to impose more pervasive
legal governance only on the "public" side.8 A number of
feminist legal theorists have pointed out, in the context of the
body, sexuality, and the family,9 that in mainstream legal analysis
these boundaries are constantly shifting and porous. This is no
less true, we suggest, for the legal construction of markets. 10
Feminist critiques have pointed out that the constitutive role of
law in markets has thus far not been on terms particularly
friendly to women. In particular, they have shown how the
neoliberal rhetorical claim about the need to free markets from
regulatory intervention has been at best partial and at worst
misleading. In fact, privatization policies in various jurisdictions,
which shift the delivery of various forms of "social goods" to the
market, are implemented and maintained by legal mechanisms. 1
Just as in the previous transformation to industrial capitalism,
states have actively engineered the global expansion and
liberalization of markets.12 Much of this engineering takes
distinctly legal forms, including international trade and
investment treaties, domestic legislative and constitutional
amendments, and executive orders and litigation, often designed
to lock in neoliberal policy choices.13 This opens up the issue of
the extent to which markets and "private" actors in them can be
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth V. Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property
Rights, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle ed., 1992); CHALLENGING

(Susan B.
Boyd ed., 1997) [hereinafter Boyd].
9. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 8; Roxanne Mykitiuk, Public Bodies, Private
Parts: Genetics in a Post-Keynesian Era, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE
CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM, supra note 2.
10. See generally Fran Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the
Public/PrivateDistinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1993); Fran Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983); Rittich, supra note 7.
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

11.

See PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM, supra

note 2.
12. See Lourdes Beneria, Economic Rationality and Globalization: A
Feminist Perspective, in FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY: BEYOND ECONOMIC

MAN (M.A. Ferber & J.A. Nelson eds., 2003).
13. See David Schneiderman,
Investment Rules
Constitutionalism,25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757 (2000).

and
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rendered susceptible to governance through norms such as
citizenship rights and practices that are associated with the
public realm.14
A predominant theme of this paper is the need to engage

more thoroughly with the implications of the constitutive role of
law in specific markets. In particular, legal regulation of markets
can be of varying intensity, ranging from substantive command
and control rules to more "decentered" forms of regulation such
as codes of conduct, norms of self-governance, or requirements
for transparency.15 Feminist legal theorists have been at the
forefront of the effort to tease out the implications of various
forms and styles of legal regulation for women. 16 This enterprise

is particularly important in the realm of transnational economic
law, which is already associated with the "soft" end of the legal
continuum. 7

The second enduring contribution is the feminist critique of
"rational apathy" as a way of behaving in markets, to which
feminist legal theorists have contributed in important ways.
"Economic man" is a rational utility-maximizer who, in
connection with economic and financial matters, has a narrow,
consistent, and predictable range of interests.18 In this world

view, it is rational to be apathetic about how corporate or
investment entities are run, because in the first place, the
individual does not have a big enough stake for active
14. See generally CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL THEORY (Bryan S. Turner ed.,
1993) [hereinafter Turner]; Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions
and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000); Jody Freeman,
The PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
15. See J. Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of
Regulation and Self-Regulation in a "Post-Regulatory World," 54 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001); Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism:
Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE
WELFARE STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986); Dimity Kingsford-Smith,
Online Investing and the Online Consumer: State and Decentered Regulatory
Responses, 26 L. & POL'Y 372 (2004); Dimity Kingsford-Smith, Beyond the Rule
of Law: Decentered Regulation in Online Investing, 26 L. & POL'Y 439 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Julie Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Women's Safety: Feminist
Challenges to Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE (H. Strang & J. Braithwaite eds., 2002).
17. See Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on
InternalAffairs in Domestic and InternationalLaw, 15 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 197
(2004).
18. See Paula England, Separative and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous
Thinking in Economics, in Fineman, supra note 3.
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involvement in governance to make any difference. Relatedly, it
is more rational to free ride on the knowledge and expertise of
institutional investors who have greater capacity to monitor
corporate entities. This assessment is subject to critique from a
number of perspectives. One of these is the critique about
"irrational apathy" from behavioral economics, most notably in
the specific case of pension decision-making.19 This is the
discovery that individual pension investors are psychologically
disposed to stick with their original choices from a menu of
investment options, when it might be more financially
advantageous to revisit those decisions.20 Another is the feminist
legal critique suggesting that active participation is a value to be
supported for its own sake, as is the importance of making
ethical judgments in a range of situations.21
A third important recent contribution of feminist theory has
been the recognition of the development of a new gender order
based on material position.22 Thus, women as a group are not

similarly situated with respect to the impact on them of
neoliberal economic developments.2 3 This is true both among

women in particular industrialized countries and between richer
and poorer countries.24 There is no doubt that feminist legal
19. See, e.g., PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004);
Mary Condon, The Feminization of Pensions? Gender, Political Economy and
Defined Contribution Pensions, in AFTER DEREGULATION: GLOBAL FINANCE
IN THE NEW CENTURY (L. Assassi et al. eds., forthcoming 2006); Donald C.
Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627 (1996).
20. See Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan
Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2002); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein,
Investment Without Education: The DisparateImpact on Women and Minorities
in Self-Directed Defined Contribution Plans, EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 223
(2001).
21. See, e.g., T.A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other
Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1387 (1992); Fineman, supra note 3; Mary Condon, Limited by Law?
Gender, Corporate Law and the Family, in LAW AS A GENDERING PRACTICE
(Dorothy E. Chunn & Dany Lacombe eds., 2000).
22. See Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, Introduction to PRIVATIZATION,
LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM, supra note 2, at 24-30.
23. See Tracey Warren, A Privileged Pole? Diversity in Women's Pay,
Pensions and Wealth in Britain,10 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 605 (2003).
24. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY
AND CULTURE, VOL. 1, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2d ed. 2000);

2005]

NEW FRONTIERS FOR FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

theory has been part of bringing down legal barriers to the
participation of women in various types of markets, notably
labor markets, but we need to remain acutely aware of the
unequal distribution of this heightened access to material
resources, especially when we look across various jurisdictions.
This last point leads to a cautionary note about the limits of
an analysis framed solely in Western-style feminist theorizing,
and undergirds our proposal for a close look at new
understandings of citizenship. Specifically, we see two major
challenges in applying feminist legal theory to issues of global
economic governance. The first is its historical tendency to focus
on the nation-state as the source of regulation and the locus of
claims-making about social citizenship rights. This approach
fails to recognize the important components of economic
policymaking, both domestic and international, that are no
longer (solely) in the hands of state processes. We need to pay
more attention to the detail of how international markets or
economic processes are constructed outside of state forms of
policymaking.26 This will help us to understand the implications
for women of the formation of international markets, and to
activate possibilities for resistance where unequal results are
produced. In particular, we need to understand the variety of
regulatory mechanisms used in the construction of these markets
and processes, because they move far beyond traditional
processes of legislation-making or litigation over contested
rights-claims. To foreshadow a point we will make in more
detail later in this paper, governance through norms of
transparency is a significant feature of how international markets
and actors operate. It is critical that feminists interrogate the
meaning and enforcement of transparency norms being
developed by market and other non-state actors.
Barbara Hobson, Some Reflections and Agendas for the Future, 10 SOC. POL.
196 (2003).
25. See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN,
MEN,

AND THE

QUEST

FOR

ECONOMIC

CITIZENSHIP

IN

20TH-CENTURY

AMERICA (2001); Jane Lewis, Economic Citizenship: A Comment, 10 SOC. POL.
176 (2003).
26. See, e.g., Fiona Beveridge, Feminist Perspectives in International
Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 173

(Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005).
27. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securitiesand Exchange Commission
and CorporateSocial Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197 (1999).
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A second and related challenge in developing a feminist
approach to transnational economic governance is to avoid
intellectual and political imperialism.
The "gender and
development" movement has been criticized for its perceived
advocacy of Western-style welfare state safety nets and greater
incorporation into capitalist markets. 28 Both of these moves, it is
argued, purport to assert cultural dominance over other forms of
community and social relations. Likewise, there is a danger that
feminist analyses of law and governance will assume the
superiority of Western gender norms over those in "other"
cultures and societies, where social relations are too often
presumed to be both static and more oppressive to women. As
Deckha warns, "this investment in the colonialist construct of
gender provides the rationale for exposing non-Western cultures
and peoples to the social engineering efforts of Western political
norms and institutions either through the partial absorption of
' '29
Western gender norms or, if necessary, by cultural extinction.
In light of this critique, feminist legal theorists who hope to
contribute to progressive projects in the realm of global
economic governance must be cognizant of the experiences and
political ideals of women in different countries and regions.
Specifically, it is important to engage in consciousness-raising
about how the market engagements of Western women and men
impact women in other jurisdictions and economic locations.
The particular strengths of feminist legal theory as an
intellectual resource for developing alternatives to neoliberal
models of economic governance lie, then, in at least three areas:
understanding the legal construction of the "private," critiquing
the precepts of "economic man" and "rational apathy," and
analyzing the emergence of a new gender order characterized by
greater inequalities among women both globally and locally.
These strengths are qualified, we have argued, by a tendency
within feminist legal theory to focus on traditional state-centered
forms of regulation and by an ongoing struggle to avoid
culturally imperialistic theorizing. We now turn to consider how
ideas of economic citizenship may contribute to this discussion.
28. See S. Charusheela & Eiman Zein-Elabdin, Feminism, Postcolonial
Thought, and Economics, in FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY: BEYOND
ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 12.
29. Maneesha Deckha, Is Culture Taboo? Feminism, Intersectionality, and
Culture Talk in Law, 16 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 14, 22-23 (2004).
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II. ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP
Recent theoretical advances within the field of citizenship
studies offer another set of insights about the governance of an
increasingly market-oriented social order. In particular, this
section assesses the potential of an emergent (and contested)
discourse of economic citizenship to enhance accountability and
social justice in the economic realm. Following an initial
discussion of citizenship theory and its critics, we unpack the
current discourse of economic citizenship into four key elements,
examining each through the lens of feminist legal theory and
gender orders.
A. Evolving Conceptions of Citizenship
Feminist theorists have often been skeptical about
citizenship claims as a means of enhancing women's material
conditions of life, given the gendered character of the statesubject relationship. In addition, post-colonial and critical race
scholars have called attention to the normative presuppositions
of Western concepts of citizenship and the denial of citizenship
privileges to racialized, colonized, and foreign others.30 Despite
the thoroughgoing critiques of citizenship and its exclusionary
tendencies historically, it has enjoyed renewed interest since the
mid-1990s as a powerful expression of claims for political
recognition and inclusion by a variety of groups.3 1 In navigating
this literature, it is important to keep in mind the distinction
between citizenship as status and citizenship as practice. For
lawyers, what counts is often the former, and law is a device for
policing the boundaries of citizenship status. Citizens have
rights, for example, to enter and leave a country as they please,
to obtain a passport, and to vote in elections. On the other hand,
the idea of citizenship as practice, or as a set of practices, is that
a particular normative content can or should be ascribed to the
indicia of citizenship and claims made on that basis. Thus for
30. See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN (1989);
Annelise Orleck, Gender, Race, and Citizenship Rights: New Views of an
Ambivalent History, 29 FEMINIST STUD. 85 (2003).
31. See ENGIN F. ISIN, BEING POLITICAL: GENEALOGIES OF CITIZENSHIP
(2002); HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES (Engin F. Isin & Bryan S. Turner
eds., 2002); Ruth Lister, Inclusion/Exclusion: The Janus Face of Citizenship, in
TOWARDS A GENDERED POLITICAL ECONOMY 98 (Joanne Cook et al. eds.,
2000).
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T.H. Marshall, for example, "social citizenship" implied a right
to a minimum level of economic security sufficient to permit
meaningful participation in the life of a society.32 As Turner puts
it:
[I]t seems to be important to emphasize the idea of practices
in order to avoid a state and juridical definition of citizenship
as merely a collection of rights and obligations. The word
"practices" should help us to understand the dynamic social
construction of citizenship which33 changes historically as a
consequence of political struggles.
Despite the revitalization of citizenship studies over the past
decade, it has continued to avoid, for the most part, the realm of
markets and the economy. Since Marshall's groundbreaking
work, it has addressed economic affairs primarily through the
concept of social citizenship, the achievement of which has been
understood as a function of state social policies in areas such as
health, housing, welfare, and education. Yet feminist and other
critical discussions of social citizenship have revealed the ways in
which existing social policies fall short of Marshall's inclusive
ideal. It is important here to avoid any false dichotomization of
''social" versus "economic" regulation; social policy is clearly
economic in that it addresses the distribution of resources and
the adjustment of market outcomes to accommodate norms of
equality and democracy. Meanwhile, economic policy has social
effects. Consider, for example, the distributive consequences of
tax concessions for capital gains, which are presented by policy
makers as economic incentives for investment but which also
reduce the share of the tax burden borne by the wealthy.' 4
Unfortunately, claims for better social policy rarely directly
address the operation of markets or the governance of market
relations. This cabining of social policy is of course a major
accomplishment of the ideological construction of the public/
private divide.

32. Thomas Humphrey Marshall,

Citizenship and Social Class, in
67 (1963).

SOCIOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS AND OTHER ESSAYS

33. Turner, supra note 14, at 2.

34. See Jack M. Mintz & Stephen R. Richardson, The Lifetime Capital
Gains Exemption: An Evaluation, 21 CAN. PUB. POL'Y-ANALYSE DE
POLITIQUES S1 (1995); Neil Brooks & Arthur Peltomaa, The Case for Full
Taxation of Capital Gains, 1 CAN. TAX'N 7 (1979).
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Recent literature has begun, albeit barely, to ask how
concepts of citizenship might apply to the domain of markets per
se. This nascent theoretical development is responding to the
declining "purchase" of conventional citizenship rights in a
neoliberal context. As explained by Hindess:
[Plolitical rights (such as they are) may remain but their scope
is restricted as market regulation takes over from direct
regulation by state agencies and the judgement of the market
is brought to bear on the conduct of states, while the social
rights of citizenship (where they exist) are pared back as
provision through the market replaces provision directly or
indirectly through the state.35
Accordingly, citizenship claims will rest on shrinking ground
unless they can be extended to those areas of social life
understood to be governed by market forces.
New attempts are thus being made to re-imagine the nature
of citizenship in this changing political environment. Far from
offering a coherent framework, the literature spans a wide array
of perspectives that are more or less celebratory or critical of the
neoliberal turn. Catchphrases such as "neoliberal citizenship,"
"market citizenship," "economic citizenship," "industrial
citizenship," "enterprise citizenship," "corporate citizenship,"
"business citizenship," and "citizenship at work" sit in tension
with each other, reflecting disparate visions of the social order.36
The term "economic citizenship discourse" is used here to
capture this emerging field as a whole. This paper does not aim
to propose a single definition or ideal version of economic
citizenship, but rather to analyze how different elements of this
discourse are at play in, or provide perspective on, the
governance of economic affairs.
Developing the concept of citizenship to encompass
markets poses some extreme challenges. Such an agenda may be
seen to offend the basic liberal premise that politics should
intrude as little as possible on economic choices and freedoms.37
35. Barry Hindess, Neo-liberal Citizenship, 6

CITIZENSHIP STUD. 127, 140

(2002).
36. Judy Fudge, After Industrial Citizenship: Market Citizenship or
Citizenship at Work?, Presentation at the CRMIT Colloquium: Citizenship at
Work? (Quebec City, 2004).
37. See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND
CAPITALISM (1986); Allan Hutchinson, Mice under a Chair: Democracy, Courts
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If the objective is to bring greater accountability and social
justice to the economic domain, there must be a recognition that
markets and market institutions are subject to public norms of
democracy and equality.38 As noted earlier, this is one place
where feminist legal theory may provide a useful corrective
through its insights about the contingent, ideological, and
gendered nature of public/private distinctions.
Even if markets can be reconstructed as part of the public
realm, though, there is a further need to redefine the role of the
state as the locus of claims-making, a problem that citizenship
theory shares with feminist legal theory. One of the ideological
claims of neoliberalism is to diminish or at least radically alter
the state's power to regulate markets. Within citizenship studies,
some have argued that enforcement of citizenship rights must
consequently evolve upward to the supra-national level, to new
public or private institutions of governance.39 Others have
sought to relocate state-like responsibilities within enlightened
transnational corporations.4'
Still others contest the alleged
demise of the nation-state, arguing for the recognition that
global neoliberalism is instantiated in state policy-making and
therefore citizens should work through local governments to
hold global market actors more accountable.4 1
In addition to reconceptualizing the role of the state, a
second challenge is to redefine the citizen as a creature of
markets. Significant critical work has been done to analyze the
realities of differential economic citizenship for individuals in
varied social locations. 42 This literature argues that discourses of
market freedom and market discipline are reshaping the gender,

and the Administrative State, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 374 (1990).
38. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 37; Freeman, supra note 14; JOEL
BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND

POWER (2004).

39. See, e.g., THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 11-14 (David Held
& Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003); Michael Muetzelfeldt & Gary Smith,
Civil Society and Global Governance: The Possibilitiesfor Global Citizenship, 6
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 55 (2002).
40. See, e.g., Jeanne M. Logsdon & Donna J. Wood, Business Citizenship:
From Domestic to Global Level of Analysis, 12 Bus. ETHICS Q. 155 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, The Participation of States and Citizens in
Global Governance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (2003).
42. See Katherine Scott, The Dilemma of Liberal Citizenship: Women and
Social Assistance in the 1990s, 50 STUD. POL. ECON. 7 (1996).
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class, and racial orders of citizenship, both within nation-states
and on an international scale.43 Alternatively, the discourse of

economic citizenship is sometimes invoked to celebrate the
power of individuals to harness and shape the market through
their own choices, whether as entrepreneurs, consumers, or
investors." The collective rights and power of labor are often
strikingly absent from such pro-market versions of economic
citizenship.
Imagining the economic citizen also involves
looking beyond individuals to consider whether the corporate
actors that now dominate markets globally are to carry any of
the rights or responsibilities of citizenship.45 Skeptics have raised
doubts as to whether corporations as currently structured and
governed are likely to assume such responsibilities voluntarily,
and whether giving citizenship rights to corporate actors will
correspondingly diminish the rights of other citizens.46
A third fundamental question is what role law plays in
framing or constituting different aspects of economic citizenship.
As noted earlier, feminist legal theorists have traced the central
role of law, in its various forms, in effecting the liberalization of
markets and privatization of welfare responsibilities. It remains
important, however, to examine the type and intensity of legal
intervention that is chosen in particular contexts. Forms of
intervention can be ranged along a continuum from more
facilitative (such as providing tax incentives or requiring
disclosure of information) to more coercive measures (such as
imposing monetary or penal sanctions for failure to comply).
For example, the case studies discussed later in this paper
43. See generally Janine Brodie, The Politics of Social Policy in the 21st
Century, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL POLICY: NEO-LIBERALISM AND BEYOND
(David Broad ed., 1997); RETHINKING RESTRUCTURING: GENDER AND
CHANGE IN CANADA (Isabella Bakker ed., 1996); Condon, supra note 2;
Philipps, supra note 2.
44. See Ute Schumacher & Gladstone Hutchinson, William E. Simon's
Capacities' Approach to Liberty: An Essay in Economic Citizenship, 31
ATLANTIC ECON. J. 283 (2003).
45. See James E. Post, Global CorporateCitizenship: Principlesto Live and
Work By, 12 Bus. ETHICS Q. 143 (2002).
46. See Sally Wheeler, Inclusive Communities and DialogicalStakeholders:
A Methodology for an Authentic Corporate Citizen, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L.
(1998); Harry Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global
Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market
Regulation, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Joanne Conaghan
et al. eds., 2002).
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describe a noticeable international trend toward transparencybased norms in the areas of both fiscal policy and investment
fund governance. While such rules may be presented as a means
of improving accountability generally, they tend to focus on the
transparency concerns of investors or credit rating agencies, not
those of less powerful constituencies. Moreover, transparency
rules reflect a choice not to impose more direct commands or
limits on acceptable economic behavior.47
In addition,
citizenship theory, like feminist legal theory, must include within
its understanding of "law" the many informal, non-state, or
supra-state governance mechanisms that are gaining importance
in a globally integrated economy. These include everything from
individual corporate codes of conduct to the articulation of "best
practices" by international agencies and industry associations.
These questions about the new objects, subjects, and
mechanisms of economic citizenship are pervasive throughout
the literature. We now turn to the additional, daunting task of
defining the substantive content of economic citizenship and
whether this could be envisioned in a way that advances gender
equality objectives.
B. Connecting Economic Citizenship and
Feminist Legal Theory: FourDimensions

There is not yet a fully articulated debate about the
appropriate content of economic citizenship, either as to its
normative aspirations or any associated legal rights and
obligations. Instead, widely differing versions of economic
citizenship co-exist within the discourse but tend not to engage
with one another, and in many cases their substantive content
remains implicit. For analytical purposes, it is helpful to identify
four substantive dimensions within the current discourse,
dimensions which admittedly overlap and interact with each
other: (1) economic liberty, interpreted as the right to access
markets; (2) economic security; (3) responsibilities of economic
citizenship; and (4) participation in economic decision-making.
Each of these elements is examined critically here through the
lens of feminist legal theory.

47.
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Economic Liberty: Access to Markets

A predominant version of economic citizenship focuses on
enhancing access to markets for labor, trade, and capital. A
focal point of feminist citizenship theory has been to expose the
gendered, racialized, and heavily qualified implementation of
the right to enter waged labor markets. Kessler-Harris, for
example, argues that the right to access paid work was only ever
taken seriously for men in the U.S., and was always qualified for
women by the importance placed upon their familial
responsibilities in a range of labor laws and other public
policies.48 One may also observe comparative differences across
jurisdictions in terms of state support for women's access to
labor markets.49 Two-tiered labor markets in turn generated
two-tiered forms of social citizenship, because the best forms of
social security were available only to those with good full-time
jobs. Kessler-Harris observes that this not only created a deeply
class-divided and racially-divided system of social citizenship
depending on who enjoyed well-paid employment, but also had
the effect of dividing women against each other because they
obtained different citizenship rights depending on how they
interacted with the labor market." This point has particular
salience for developing a theory of economic citizenship that
addresses gender, as it points to the vast differences among
women in terms of their engagement with, and privilege in, a
variety of markets. In fact, class polarization among women may
be increasing as a few attain the highest tiers of the employment
market, while many more have increasingly precarious jobs in
the "flexible" and internationalized labor markets promoted by
neoliberal policies. 1
As in many other strands of feminist theory, those
concerned to enhance women's citizenship rights have often
advocated measures to improve women's access to waged work.
This enthusiasm for labor market access has been increasingly
tempered, however, by a recognition of the oppressive work
48. See generally Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuitof Economic Citizenship,
10 Soc. POL. 157 (2003).
49. See generally Hobson, supra note 24; Lewis, supra note 25.
50. Kessler-Harris, supra note 48, at 164-67.
51. See Vosko, supra note 7; Sylvia Walby, The Restructuring of the
Gendered Political Economy: Transformation in Women's Employment, in
TOWARDS A GENDERED POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 31.
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conditions faced by many lower-income and racialized women,
the false equality of paid work in the face of women's continuing
responsibility for the bulk of social reproductive labor, and the
need to recognize unpaid caregiving as valuable form of
participation in society and the economy.52 Thus, feminist
scholars have criticized a neoliberal trend toward associating
citizenship rights only with the control of market income,
denying both social supports and political voice to those deemed
overly dependent. 3
Feminist legal theory can contribute to these debates by
analyzing in concrete, specific terms how law constructs different
markets and gendered hierarchies of economic citizenship within
them. A good example is Fudge's work on recent reforms to
employment standards laws, particularly the gendered
implications of relaxing maximum work hour restrictions, in a
context of increasing privatization of caregiving responsibilities
within families. 4 Legal feminists also need to scrutinize the
various legislative reforms coming forward under the banner of
work/family balance and valuing women's unpaid labor.55 While
feminist demands for action on unpaid caregiving have helped to
stimulate these types of policy changes, when closely examined
they tend to fall short of addressing gender equality concerns
and indeed run the risk of undercutting women's access to means
of financial independence.56 Thus, Canada has introduced
income-tax credits for caregivers that are available only as a
reduction in tax liability for a household breadwinner, so they
cannot be accessed directly by an unpaid caregiver or by lowincome households.57
Similarly, Fudge has argued that
52. See generally Jane Lewis & Susanna Giullari, The Adult Worker Model
Family, Gender Equality and Care: The Search for New Policy Principles and
the Possibilitiesand Problems of a CapabilitiesApproach, 34 ECON. & SoC'Y 76
(2005).
53. See generally Ruth Lister, Women, Economic Dependency and
Citizenship, 10 J. SOC. POL. 445 (1990); Carole Pateman, Contributing to
Democracy, 4 REV. CONST. STUD. 191 (1998); Philipps, supra note 2, at 60.
54. Judy Fudge, Flexibility and Feminization:The New Ontario Employment
Standards Act, 16 J. L. & SOC. POL. 1 (2000).
55. See, e.g., Ruth Lister, The Dilemmas of Pendulum Politics: Balancing
Paid Work, Care and Citizenship, 31 ECON. & Soc. 520 (2002).
56. See generally Catherine Fisk, Book Note, In Pursuit of Equity: Women,
Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America, 51
BUFF. L. REV. 409 (2003).
57. See generally Lisa Philipps, Taxing the Market Citizen: FiscalPolicy and

2005]

NEW FRONTIERS FOR FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

exempting small employers from new family leave provisions
leaves out the very workers who most need help to bargain for
such flexibility.58 And the shift from welfare to 'workfare' has
made clear that unpaid caregiving is not valued for the lowest
income households but rather is discouraged in favor of highly
exploitive forms of market participation. 9 A major challenge
lies ahead to gender the analysis of a full range of economic
laws. For example, recent work on the legal framework for
corporate decision-making needs also to be further explored
from a gender perspective. 6°
Beyond labor market access is the question of liberalized
capital, consumer, and credit markets and how these relate to
the nature of citizenship. Allowing private actors to trade and
invest more freely across borders has been advocated in terms of
efficiency, but also sometimes in terms of promoting equal
economic citizenship.61 Others take issue with this version of
formal equality, arguing that international trade and investment
agreements, and the legal measures needed to implement and
enforce them locally, have either formally or informally
constitutionalized a model of economic citizenship that
privileges the property rights of investors over the democratic
choices of local states and populations.62 These developments
are intensified by the drive, promoted by entities such as the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
to harmonize international investment standards. This issue is
taken up in more detail in one of the case studies to follow.
The principle of open markets has also been criticized on
the basis that it applies unequally to rich and poor nations.
Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 111 (2000);
Philipps, supra note 2.
58. Fudge, supra note 54.
59. See generally LUCIE E. WHITE, HARD LABOR: POOR WOMEN AND WORK
IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA (1998).
60. See, e.g., Bakan, supra note 38; Mary Condon, Limited by Law? Gender,
Corporate Law and the Family Firm, in LAW AS A GENDERING PRACTICE
(Dorothy Chunn & Dany Lacombe eds., 2000).
61. See generally ROBERT HOWSE, ECONOMIC UNION, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: TOWARDS A HIGH BUT LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

(1992).
62. See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 41; David Schneiderman, Economic
Citizenship and Deliberative Democracy: An Inquiry into Constitutional
Limitations on Economic Regulation, 21 QUEEN'S L.J. 125 (1995);
Schneiderman, supra note 13.
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Hindess argues that Western citizenship norms have been foisted
upon developing countries as a condition of accessing
international markets for goods, services, capital, and credit, as
well as international financial aid.63 Whereas previously
developing countries were disciplined by the denial of citizenship
rights, he asserts, now they are disciplined by development
regimes that attempt to promote citizenship as a set of good
governance practices that will create political stability and secure
(or manufacture) consent to market reforms.'
A concrete
example of this disciplining effect is explored in the second case
study below on the promulgation of fiscal transparency codes by
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among
others.
2. Economic Security

The notion of access to minimum levels of economic
security so as to ensure participation in public life is, as was
mentioned earlier, closely associated with Marshall, and
expressed by him as the post-WWII idea of "social citizenship."
On this view, "the state should provide the social and
educational resources for the making of citizens."65 Marshall's
idea of social citizenship has been critiqued from a number of
perspectives, including its neglect of gender as well as "the role
of struggle and social movements in the development of
rights."66 Revisionist historians might also argue that Marshall's
ideal was not represented in the reality of how welfare states
operated, especially in the North American context.6 7
A central issue for this paper is Marshall's view of the state
as the primary guarantor of social rights. In an era of state
retrenchment and restructuring, this role has been considerably
eroded, at least in relation to individuals who rely on public
services,68 though arguably states have taken on a new role in
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Hindess, supra note 35.
Id.

(2001).
Id. at 6.
See generally GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE
CAPITALISM (1990); Kessler-Harris, supra note 25; Janet Siltanen, Paradise
Paved? Reflections on the Fate of Social Citizenship in Canada, 6 CITIZENSHIP
STUD. 395 (2002).
68. See generally Brenda Cossman, Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and NeoConservative Visions of the Reprivatization Project, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW,
COLIN CROUCH ET AL., CITIZENSHIP, MARKETS AND THE STATE 5
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guaranteeing economic security to corporate interests protected
under international agreements and domestic laws. Citizenship
theory must contend with these developments on two levels.
The first is to analyze the trend within the state to align public
services and programs more closely with market imperatives,
and how this is changing the nature of social citizenship. The
second and more novel challenge is to consider whether claims
for baseline economic security must reach beyond the state to
address corporations or market institutions more directly. Thus,
to what extent can firms or other market institutions be expected
to redress the increasing economic insecurity caused by the
retrenchment of the state, for example, by providing pension
guarantees or health benefits?
With regard to the first of these issues, it must be
acknowledged that welfare state programs have long referenced
the market in a variety of ways. The most generous and least
stigmatized benefits have always been conditional upon
participation in labor markets, as is the case in Canada in
relation to employment insurance, maternity, and parental leave
coverage, and much pension provision. This system has been
criticized for perpetuating inequalities, especially gender
inequalities, given the more equivocal relationship to the fulltime labor market of women who engage in caregiving.69
Feminist researchers have documented the relations of
dependency promoted by welfare states in which women
accessed social security indirectly through dependence on a male
breadwinner, or else settled for second-class benefits in the form
of welfare.7" Apart from the adverse material consequences, the
discursive effect of this dependency is that eligibility for such
benefits is not tied to more encompassing notions of political

supra note 2.
69. See, e.g., Gillian Calder, Recent Changes to the Maternity and Parental
Leave Benefits Regime as a Case Study: The Impact of Globalization on the
Delivery of Social Programs in Canada, 15 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 342
(2003); Condon, supra note 2; Kessler-Harris, supra note 25.
70. Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The
Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, 58 AM. Soc.
REV. 303 (1993); Julia O'Connor, Gender, Class and Citizenship in the
Comparative Analysis of Welfare State Regimes: Theoretical and
Methodological Issues, 44 BRITISH J. SOCIOLOGY 501 (1993); JULIA SOHRAB,
AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM,

SEXING THE BENEFIT:
INDEPENDENCE (1996).
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citizenship, but rather to narrower thresholds of labor market
participation, or even employment with specific employers.
A hallmark of neoliberalism has been to require the welfare
arm of the state to act more like the market in its activities, with
the actual delivery of state-provided benefits being accomplished
in some cases by private corporations and religious
organizations.71 The delivery of benefits by the state is now
considered less legitimate than if they are provided by private
market transactions.72 Legal feminists have tracked the specific
implications of recent waves of welfare state restructuring with
particular attention to their gendered impact.73 For example,
Smith has documented the coercive and racialized sexual
regulation of poor women accomplished by recent reforms to
welfare legislation in the U.S. 74 In Canada, changes to the
funding arrangements of the Canada Pension Plan have
permitted riskier forms of market investment, and the U.S. has
debated shifting to a system of individualized retirement
accounts. The gendered implications of these reforms have just
begun to be analyzed.
Without diminishing the importance of this work, we
observe that critiques of neoliberal social security reform retain
the state as their main focus, in keeping with the traditional
orientations of both citizenship studies and feminist legal theory.
A key question moving forward is whether and how claims for
baseline economic security could reach further into markets. As
the state continues to retrench or reshape,76 we argue it is time to
consider more specifically the potentially fractured, uneven, and
gendered provision of benefits by the market, and the
implications of the neoliberal approach to economic security for
particular versions of economic citizenship. 77 As Siltanen puts it:
71. See generally Brodie, supra note 43; Hindess, supra note 35.
72. See generally R. Ericson et al., The Moral Hazards of Neo-Liberalism:
Lessons from the PrivateInsurance Industry, 29 ECON. & Soc. 532 (2000).
73. See, e.g., McCluskey, supra note 3.
74. Anne Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary
Welfare Reform: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 (2001).
75. See, e.g., Condon, supra note 2; Condon, supra note 19; Warren, supra
note 23.
76. See generally J. Braithwaite, The New Regulatory State and the
Transformationof Criminology,40 BRIT. J. CRIM. 222 (2000).
77. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTANCE: AGAINST
TYRANNY OF THE MARKET (1998).
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[W]e must see social citizenship as an issue within the
'market,' not just outside of it . . . responsibility for the

delivery of social citizenship is broader than a state-individual
relationship ....It is to insist that our claims for a decent life

are as relevant in our relationships with employers, banks,
insurance companies, retailers, service providers, family
members and neighbours ...

as they are in our relationships

78
with national, provincial and municipal governments.

From a feminist legal theory perspective, we suggest that as
governments turn to market instruments to deliver economic
security, we must not only analyze the state's changing role but
must also turn our gaze to the policies of market and economic
institutions such as investment dealers, stock exchanges,
corporate management, and industry associations.
The
challenge that this presents in a context of transnational
corporate activity is, of course, not to be underestimated.
3. Responsibilitiesof Economic Citizenship
A number of commentators have noted that neoliberal
discourse emphasizes individual citizens as bearers of obligations
rather than rights. Thus, Lister points out in relation to "current
meanings of citizenship," "heavily influenced by the New Right
in the United States, the emphasis is on replacing the language
of entitlement with that of obligation" or a "softer version" that
emphasizes "responsibility discharged through neighbourliness,
voluntary action and charity."79 The market citizen is a genderneutral creature who is as self-reliant and entrepreneurial as
possible" and who participates in self-governance via norms of
risk management.81 We have made the point in previous work
that this picture of the market citizen is inherently gendered.82
However, attention is also needed to the ways in which
economic citizenship discourse is expanding the notion of who is
a citizen beyond the individual. Ideas of corporate citizenship
are increasingly invoked, both by corporations themselves and
78. Janet Siltanen, supra note 67, at 407-08.
79. Lister, supra note 53, at 453-54.
80. See Scott, supra note 42; see also generally NIKOLAS S. ROSE, POWERS OF
FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT (1999).
81. RICHARD V. ERICSON & KEVIN D. HAGGERTY, POLICING THE RISK
SOCIETY 93-94 (1997).

82. Philipps, supra note 2; Condon, supra note 2.
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by those who would reform corporate "behavior," to convey a
sense of the obligations that should be undertaken by corporate
actors.83 Interestingly, Whitehouse argues that recourse to new
ideas of corporate citizenship represents a dilution of older
notions of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which had their
heyday in the 1970s.'
She argues that this is problematic
precisely because the newer set of ideas emphasizes the use of
voluntary initiatives on the part of economic actors rather than
more coercive regimes of regulation, which were advocated for
by those promoting a corporate social responsibility agenda.
This argument resonates with more generalized claims about the
shift away from command-and-control types of legal regulation
towards more "decentered" forms of regulation that emphasize
strategies of self-regulation, best practices, and voluntary
codes.86

On the other hand, Power argues that while the critical
discourse of CSR has been transformed or even diluted by large
corporate organizations, "somewhere between corporate fears of
loss in the face of legal liability and hope in the form of
enhanced reputation,"87 its internalization within these large
organizations has become increasingly possible. This is because
of the rise in risk-management discourses within corporations
represented by the more fine-grained management of "the
routines and habits of organizational life" which are capable of
including CSR objectives in their ambit.8 At the same time, it
must be acknowledged that the impact of globalization on
corporate activity has been to attenuate traditional forms of
domestic legal regulation, with the implication that corporations
are increasingly free to choose the intensity of the citizenship
obligations they are prepared to undertake.
Indeed the
increased "hollowing out" of Canadian corporations has had a
83. J. B. White, How Should We Talk about Corporations? The Language of
Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L. J. 1416,1418 (1985).
84. See generally L. Whitehouse, Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate
Citizenship and the Global Compact: A New Approach to Regulating Corporate
Social Power, 3 GLOBAL SOC. POL'Y 299 (2003).
85. Id. at 300.
86. See, e.g., Black, supra note 15; Mary Condon, Technologies of Risk?
Regulating Online Investing in Canada,26 L. & POL'Y 411 (2004).
87. M. Power, Risk Management and the Responsible Organization,in RISK
AND MORALITY 146 (R. Ericson & A. Doyle eds., 2003).
88. Id. at 147.
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detrimental effect on the extent to which they assume local
citizenship responsibilities, for example, in the form of charitable
donations.89
A central issue for feminist legal theory is to investigate how

law and the public/private divide that it polices, disciplines or
protects different economic interests.
For example, the
introduction of more severe penalties for welfare fraud has had
particular effects on low-income households headed by women.90

By contrast, there is an ongoing debate as to whether the
"responsibilities" of corporate citizenship, however robust,
should be voluntarily implemented by organizations themselves
or should be impressed on corporations by more traditional

forms of legal regulation.91 In practice, the compromise has
often been for the state to regulate, but only to the extent of
requiring transparency of corporate decisions. 2 A contrast can
be observed, then, between the disciplining effect of individual
market citizenship and the more voluntary and disclosure-

oriented tone of corporate citizenship discourse.93 This contrast
harkens back to the continuum noted earlier between facilitative
and coercive versions of the legal constitution of economic
citizenship, a point pursued in the case studies below.

89. See Harry W. Arthurs, The Hollowing out of Corporate Canada?, in
GLOBALIZING

INSTITUTIONS:

CASE STUDIES IN SOCIAL REGULATION

AND

INNOVATION (Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2001).

90. See generally Dorothy E. Chunn & Shelley A. M. Gavigan, Welfare
Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation of the "Never Deserving" Poor,
13 Soc. LEGAL STUD. 219 (2004); JANET MOSHER ET AL., WALKING ON
EGGSHELLS: ABUSED WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES OF ONTARIO'S WELFARE
SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT OF RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE WOMAN AND
ABUSE WELFARE RESEARCH PROJECT (2004); DISORDERLY PEOPLE: LAW AND
THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION IN ONTARIO (Joe Hermer & Janet Mosher eds.,

2002).
91. Ronald B. Davis, In Whose Interests? Democracy and Accountability
for Corporate Governance Activity by Pension Funds (2004) (unpublished
S.J.D. thesis, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law); Logsdon & Wood, supra
note 40, at 158.
92. Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 47, at 56.
93. See generally Stepan Wood, Green Revolution or Greenwash? Voluntary
Environmental Standards, Public Law, and Private Authority in Canada, in
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE (Law Commission of

Canada ed., 2003).
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4. Participationin Economic Decision-making
The final element at play in economic citizenship discourse
is the question of how and when citizens are to participate in the
governance of markets. A striking aspect of neoliberalism is the
discourse of inevitability-the notion that "economic forces
cannot be resisted."94 Yet participation in economic governance
is critical precisely because so many more policy choices are
being characterized as economic in nature or constrained by
economic imperatives.
The quality of political citizenship in relation to economic
governance has long been notoriously thin.
Regulatory
processes are vulnerable to capture by those with concentrated
interests, ample resources, and the ability to participate in
prevailing technocratic discourses of economic policy.
By
contrast, it has been easy to sideline social justice advocates who
speak for more dispersed material interests and who adopt other
economic rationalities or have other forms of expertise. This
raises a general issue of identifying the preconditions for
effective economic citizenship; for example, sufficient levels of
economic literacy to engage in detailed reform debates and fully
understand the distributive implications of technical proposals.
It also illustrates for social justice advocacy groups the tension
between working within dominant discourses or attempting to
advance alternative understandings of the economy.
A particular challenge is to increase the participation of
women in market governance and to problematize the use of
gender-blind analytic frameworks by economic policymakers.
Here, the discourse of rational apathy, which would valorize the
individual's passivity in relation to her/his investments, runs up
against the value of informed and ethical participation. Added
to this is the problem of women's unequal access to
organizational and technical resources, and the scale of this
barrier multiplies when action must be coordinated across
international borders. An important issue is how feminist legal
experts can work with grassroots political feminists towards
democratic ends. While those with professional training may
have the best chance of impacting the policy process because
they can frame their arguments in the language of orthodox

94. Bourdieu, supra note 77, at 31.
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economic knowledge, this may be far removed from the practical
concerns and alternative economic literacies of community
advocates. A further issue is to design modes of political action
and participation that are not dominated by class-privileged
women and their concerns. This once again highlights the
importance of developing concepts of economic citizenship that
take account of gender, race, and class.
Feminist legal theorists need also to consider the
effectiveness of different modes of participation. A basic
distinction can be drawn between approaches that seek to use
markets or market institutions themselves as levers for
increasing accountability, and those that work through more
traditional government regulation or supra-national governance
institutions. The first model addresses questions of participation
by construing market choice as the new politics. In neoliberal
versions of this approach, individuals contribute to the best
possible allocation of resources to meet human needs simply by
exercising their talents and expressing their preferences in the
market. Thus, Schumacher and Hutchinson use the phrase
"economic citizenship" to refer generally to the enhanced
autonomy and capacity of individuals to participate in free
enterprise." Similarly, Braithwaite and Drahos describe middleclass investors as a "mass public" that has forced corporations to
become more transparent and accountable through informed
decision-making about which shares or mutual funds will provide
the best return, or which investment advisors to trust with their
savings.9 6

More progressive versions of this argument emphasize the
responsibilities of consumers and investors to exert market
pressure on corporations to change unjust or harmful business
practices, for example through consumer boycotts, shareholder
activism, ethical investing, or targeted consumption of "fair
trade" goods.97 Some of these issues are currently being
considered in the debate about using employer-sponsored
pension funds for socially responsible ends.98 Such pensions, of
95. See generally Schumacher & Hutchinson, supra note 44.
96. Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 47, at 60.
97. See generally OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE

STANDARDS:

TRADE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY (2002).
98. See, e.g., ROBIN BLACKBURN, BANKING ON DEATH OR INVESTING IN
LIFE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF PENSIONS (2002).
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course, represent private market benefits as a consequence of
specific types of labor market participation. Thus, it is proposed
that employees should use their pension funds to create the
''opportunity to shape the pattern of investment and business
practice in their region and in the wider economy of which it is a
part."99 Proponents of socially responsible activity by pension
funds are more or less radical in the goals they seek to achieve
with such a program, ranging from modest insertions of ethical
awareness or "screening" into the decision-making of pension
funds, all the way to Blackburn's more generalized strategies of
using "self-managed social funds" to "complement other
progressive anti-capitalist strategies." 1" Blackburn argues that
by "employing large assets in a responsible way," pension funds
could "complement and complete that 'socialisation of the
market' argued for by Diane Elson."1 °1 He argues that "the
workers and citizens should, collectively, take over capitalist
institutions and not only run them but subordinate them to new
rules of management and investment.""1 2 Ultimately, such
strategies would undoubtedly have to overcome the significant
coordination problems of collective action.
While such strategies may be quite effective to alter
corporate behavior in particular cases, 103 their overall potential
as a means of subjecting economic power to democratic control
is less clear. Some have argued these approaches are inherently
limited by a lack of coordination, the difficulty of sustaining high
levels of public awareness of corporate misbehavior in myriad
locations around the world, and the fact they can be effectively
employed only by those with some measure of resources such as
middle class consumers in developed countries."° This point
underlines the need for collaboration among feminists in rich
and poor countries in choosing which campaigns and modes of
activism to pursue.
A question that could be tackled through the lens of
feminist legal theory is how law frames and regulates the
possibilities for political action within the sphere of the market.
99. Id. at 498-99.
100. Id. at 524.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 526.
103. Logsdon & Wood, supra note 40, at 168-69.
104. Wheeler, supra note 46, at 7-8.
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In the context of pension fund activism in relation to their
underlying corporate investments, for example, the constitutive
role of law is accomplished through a variety of legal doctrines.
These include particular meanings of fiduciary duty, the
"prudent person" rule,'11 and other constraints on the
formulation of investment policies. 10 6 It is noteworthy that the
U.K. in 2000 amended its pensions regulations to require
pension funds to disclose whether they have a policy with respect
to socially responsible investing.01 7
Advocates of a more
progressive approach by employer-sponsored funds to
investment decision-making also need to address the policy
question of whether their goals are best accomplished by
pension funds pressuring their investment targets to act in a
certain way, or by using regulation more directly to set standards
for the activities of commercial corporations.
In contrast to those who focus on market-based inputs to
economic decision-making, other commentators examine instead
how more traditional forms of political citizenship could be
developed to boost democratic participation in the governance
of economic affairs at national and international levels. At the
most general level, Beneria identifies the need for a worldwide
democratic debate about the proper goals of economic policy,
suggesting that while feminists have been effective in certain
local struggles, they have yet to translate their role to the global
level. 0 Sassen makes the case that notwithstanding the effects
of globalization, participation in economic governance might be
most effectively pursued through nation-states. 019 Since states
have shown a capacity to adjust their practices and policies to
global pressures and neoliberal discourses, she argues, this same
capacity might be developed to provide national-level channels
for people to hold global economic actors accountable. By
working through states, economic governance may be
105. See, e.g., Anonymous, "Prudent Person Rule" Standard for the
Investment of Pension Fund Assets, 83 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 43 (2002).
106. See, e.g., Freya Kodar, The Transformative Potential of Pension Fund
Investment Activism (2002) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Osgoode Hall Law
School).
107. See The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment,
Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc.) Amendment Regulations, SI 1999 No. 1849 § 11A
(1999) [herinafter SI 1999].
108. Beneria, supra note 12.
109. Sassen, supra note 41.
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democratized without the need to wait for a global state or set of
supra-national citizenship institutions.
Yet as Schneiderman points out, states have often acted as
the frontline defenders of market reforms in the face of popular
democratic resistance) n0 The solution to this conundrum may lie
in avoiding monolithic reliance on any one institution, and
instead promoting cooperative action and networking among
different state and civil society agencies interested in promoting
democratization of economic governance, at both national and
supra-national levels.'
Working from the interrelated
perspectives of feminist legal theory and economic citizenship,
we turn now to briefly discuss two different examples of
transnational economic governance. Our purpose here is to flag
commonalities and tensions across different ways of governing
global economic processes, in terms of the forms of economic
citizenship they call into being and the intensity of the legal
regulation involved.
III. FIRST CASE STUDY: INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS
There are a number of issues involving the internationalization of capital-raising and securities markets that could be
assessed from the point of view of their susceptibility to feminist
analysis and economic-citizenship-type interventions. Examples
might include the impact of structural adjustment policies
promulgated by the IMF and international institutional investors
with negative effects for local populations subject to them, 12 or
the international spreading of the gospel of Anglo-Americanstyle corporate governance in the wake of scandals like Enron,
which give a heightened role to activism by institutional
investors." 3 But the focus of this case study of international
economic governance is on the contemporary role of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
110. Schneiderman, supra note 13.
111. Muetzelfeldt & Smith, supra note 39.
112. See generally Lourdes Beneria, Globalization,Gender and Davos Man,
5 FEMINIST ECON. 61 (1999).

113. See generally Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the
Rule of Law: Enron, FinancialFraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1579 (2002); Felicia H. Kung, The Rationalization of Regulatory
Internationalization,33 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 443 (2002).

2005]

NEW FRONTIERS FOR FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

in actively setting standards for the operation of mutual funds, or
as they are known internationally, collective investment schemes
(CISs).
In general, a mutual fund or collective investment scheme is
a vehicle for pooling investment by an open-ended number of
investors. The value of each person's investment is computed by
reference to a proportionate interest in the entire portfolio of
assets or investments made by the fund. The investor devolves
the responsibility for investing to the expertise of the fund's
managers, and because her capital is pooled with others, she is
able to take advantage of diversification and other risk
management strategies that might be less feasible individually.
In many jurisdictions, individual investment in mutual funds has
become increasingly important to retirement well-being as both
state and employer funding of pension schemes has declined or
been reshaped in accordance with employer concerns about
exposure to open-ended pension obligations.
There are really two stories in relation to international
economic governance to be told by way of this brief case study.
One is about the role played by IOSCO generally in economic
governance, and the other is about the development of
international understandings of how CISs should operate. In
both cases, the question addressed is the susceptibility of either
IOSCO generally, or norms about the operation of CISs more
specifically, to the implications of specific forms of economic
citizenship discourse. Our starting point is that IOSCO is the
single institution identified with the attempt to harmonize
standards and regulation of securities markets in hundreds of
countries. IOSCO has over 170 members, who are mostly
representatives of domestic securities market regulators.' 14 It
operates largely through a low-visibility committee structure, on
which are represented member regulators of key securities
markets. These committees formulate consultation documents
which eventually result in IOSCO-sanctioned principles or
standards of regulation in various substantive subject areas of
securities law. IOSCO standards are increasingly becoming a
114. See International Organization of Securities Commissions, http://www.
iosco.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2005); see also generally Dimity KingsfordSmith, Networks, Norms and the Nation State: Thoughts on Pluralism and
Globalized Securities Regulation, in JURISPRUDENCE FOR AN INTERCONNECTED
GLOBE (Catherine Dauvergne ed., 2002).
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powerful benchmark of how domestic regulators are expected to
govern, and indeed conformity to IOSCO standards is
increasingly the platform of mainstream academic and
policymaker critiques of the regulatory efforts of domestic
securities regulators. 1" 5
While IOSCO's beginnings are rather murky, it has grown
to have a powerful role in articulating expectations for how
national regulators are expected to govern their domestic
securities markets. In this sense, it is a hard organization to
place on the traditional public/private divide. Insofar as the
regulation of capital markets is a "public" preoccupation in
many countries, IOSCO is engaged in "public" regulation, and
its members are typically public domestic regulatory agencies.
However, it does not have the international status of
organizations like the United Nations or even the World Trade
Organization.
It clearly operates according to very low
standards of "public" accountability.'16 As an organization, it is
financed by the relatively modest contributions of its members.
There are a number of other interesting things about
IOSCO from the point of view of its susceptibility to economic
citizenship interventions. First, and obviously, it has no robust
independent enforcement role and operates only by consensus of
its members. It therefore acts according to a "decentred" mode
of legal regulation.1 17 However, it has played an important role
in providing benchmarks for international co-operation by
promulgating a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
which has some thirty country signatures, as well as coordinating
the signing of bilateral Memoranda of Understanding especially
between countries with "developed" and "emerging" markets.
Furthermore, it has recently become more aggressive in
promoting cross-border enforcement of domestic securities law
by announcing that it is prepared to publish the names of

115. See, e.g., International Money Fund, Canada: Report on the
Observance of Standards and Codes-Fiscal Transparency Module (March
2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2002/crO251.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2005).
116. See David Zaring, International Law by other Means: The Twilight
Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations,33 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 281 (1998).
117. See generally Teubner, supra note 15; Black, supra note 15; KingsfordSmith, supra note 15.
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offshore financial centers that do not cooperate with crossborder investigations.' 18 Second, its standard-setting enterprise
has been conducted under a significant veil of secrecy, so that it
is difficult for feminists or others to interrogate the norms that
form the basis of its standard-setting enterprise. In response to
criticism about this opacity, it has recently adopted a
"consultation policy and procedure."' 19 This policy indicates
that IOSCO will maintain "a flexible approach" to public
consultations and will take a number of factors into account in
determining whether or not to seek "public comment from the
international financial community."'2 ° It indicates that IOSCO
will generally attempt to "consult the full spectrum of the
international financial community" and in appropriate cases may
seek input from "groups, working groups, entities or
associations" that are specifically affected by the issue being
examined.'21 This makes clear that, despite the possibility of
increased transparency about how IOSCO develops its
standards, it will ultimately retain control of when a public.
consultation process will be mobilized, and individual investors
or the public generally will need to be organized into specific
and recognizable entities in order to be involved in the process.
More specifically, the reason for examining CISs has to do
with their interesting social location in relation to countries of
the North and countries of the South. 122 In the former, we have
noted that mutual funds have a significant role to play as
providers of retirement well-being in an increasingly privatized
retirement system. They are particularly important for women
working in Western countries where the availability of
employer-sponsored pension plans for other than full-time work
is shrinking. Even where employer-sponsored pensions are still
available, they increasingly take the form of so-called defined
118. Press Release, Financial Stability Forum, FSF Announces a New
Process to Promote Further Improvements in Offshore Financial Centres
(OFCs) (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCON
EWS86.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
119. See generally Executive Committee of the International Organization
of Securities Commissions, IOSCO Consultation Policy and Procedure (April
2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD197.pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id.
122. See generally Kung, supra note 113.
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contribution pensions, which do not promise a particular pension
value upon retirement. Many such pension schemes offer
employees the opportunity to make their own investment
choices, often from a menu of various mutual fund products.
Yet in relation to countries of the South, there is a sense that
catering to the interests of mutual funds or CISs from
"developed" countries-which are looking for reliable capital
markets and robust enforcement mechanisms for their
international financial transactions -comes at the expense of
home-grown forms of "social citizenship" or social relations in
those countries which might otherwise de-emphasize the need to
court international capital or favor robust democratic control
over the operation of local capital markets. Thus, the operations
of investment funds assist in a concrete fashion to instantiate an
unequal transnational gender order.
One issue for feminist legal theory that flows from this
inequality problem is whether the changing forms of legal
regulation of mutual funds might or might not allow investors in
Western countries to express an expanded sense of "economic
citizenship" to include solidarity with the populations where the
mutual fund's foreign investment takes place. Again, it is worth
noting the example of recent changes to British pension
regulations, which now require pension funds to disclose "the
extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or ethical
considerations are taken into account
in the selection, retention,
123
investments.
of
realization
and
Meanwhile, IOSCO has been active in establishing
standards for CISs. Two areas of that activity will be briefly
considered here: first, its evolving approach to the internal
governance of CISs, and second, IOSCO's views on the role that
could be played by CISs in the corporate governance of the firms
in which they invest.
A. Standard-Settingin Relation to Internal Governance

For some time IOSCO has been concerned about the issue
of conflicts of interest exhibited by operators of CISs. Examples
of this concern may be found in the May 2000 report of IOSCO's
Technical Committee. 124 Here, the committee tends to rely on a
123. SI 1999, supra note 107.
124. See generally Report of the Technical Committee of the International
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combination of the fiduciary responsibility of the CIS operator
and disclosure of information about the existence of conflicts.
Thus, the report indicates that "[r]eliance on general principles is
generally premised on the assumption that prescriptive
standards are more likely to lead to a check-list approach
relating to compliance and also, the emergence of avoidance
mechanisms by CIS operators and their affiliates. ' 125 This
decentered approach to norm generation retained significant
autonomy for the operators of CISs and something of a lack of
confidence in IOSCO's ability to engineer cultures of
compliance within these organizations.
More recently, IOSCO has promulgated a consultation
report prepared by IOSCO's standing committee on investment
management concerning governance of CISs. l2 6 Comments on
this report are solicited from the "international financial
community.' ' 27 While canvassing the diverse legal structures
framing the operation of CISs in a variety of jurisdictions, the
report places great importance on the role of "independent
entities" to act from an "outside perspective" so as to protect
1 28
CIS investors from "divergent behaviors of the CIS operator.'
Again, the committee does not propose prescriptive standards
on the basis that this might lead to avoidance mechanisms.
Notably, there is a complete absence of discussion about having
actual investors participate in this oversight role. In Canada, this
possibility has been summarily dismissed as inconsistent with the
desire for investors to act according to models of "rational
apathy.' 1 29 Here there is perhaps a role for feminists to support
Organization of Securities Commissions, Conflicts of Interests of CIS
Operators (May 2000), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD108.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
125. Id. at 15-16.
126. See generally Technical Committee of the International Organization
of Securities Commissions, Consultation Report: Examination of Governance
for Collective Investment Schemes (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.iosco.
org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD183.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 10.
129. See generally Jeffrey Larsen, Institutional Investors, Corporate
Governance and Proxy Voting Diclosure, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Poonam Puri & Jeffrey
Larsen eds., 2004); Ontario Securities Commission, Proposed National
Instrument No. 81-107, Independent Review Committee for Investment Funds
(Jan. 9, 2004), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/

THOMAS JEFFERSON LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 28:105

greater opportunities for individual investors to participate in
the governance of CISs, while acknowledging the risks of
participation on an "investment" basis as opposed to a more
generally "public" basis.
B. Role of CISs in External CorporateGovernance

With respect to CISs' exercise of their shareholder power
over the entities in which they invest, there are clear signs of a
movement away from the traditional economic perspective of
the value of passivity and the exercise of the "exit" option as a
sign of dissatisfaction with corporate management. In this
context, "rational apathy" may be on the defensive despite a
strong rearguard action mounted by the trade associations
representing mutual funds in the U.S. and Canada. 3 ' IOSCO's
clear support of CIS practices in relation to corporate
governance, especially in connection with the exercise of
shareholder voting rights by CISs, is couched in the language of
the need for greater transparency so as to allow individual
'
investors to make "informed investment decisions. 131
Incidentally, this development demonstrates the contingency of
the concept of a fiduciary duty. Formerly, such duties would
have weighed against exercising voting rights on the basis that
they distracted investment managers from their core obligations.
Now, the same duty may require these voting rights to be
exercised as a means of pursuing shareholder value. The
question here is how far this can be pushed by investment
activists in the direction of establishing norms of ethical
corporate decision-making in a global context.

Current/Part8/rule_20040109_81-107_review-mutual.jsp (last visited Dec. 20,
2005) (comments on proposed rule available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/
Regulation/Proposed/prp-index.jsp).
130. See generally REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, COLLECTIVE

INVESTMENT SCHEMES AS SHAREHOLDERS: RESPONSIBILITIES AND DISCLOSURE

(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOP
D158.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
131. Id. at 8.
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IV. SECOND CASE STUDY: TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE OF FISCAL LAW AND POLICY
This case study examines the interaction of states and
international agencies in constructing new norms of "fiscal
transparency" to promote disclosure through budget processes
of specific information about government's fiscal policy
objectives and performance. In principle, improved fiscal
transparency could be consistent with a progressive version of
economic citizenship in which a better-informed public can
effectively scrutinize and participate in debates around budget
policy as a key element of state-centered economic governance.
Yet it is important to interrogate the new standards to determine
how the "public" is conceived for this purpose and what forms of
accountability are being promoted. This brief discussion will
focus in particular on whether fiscal transparency rules create
any new avenues for confronting the unequal, gendered impacts
of tax and expenditure policies. It concludes that while there is
latent potential to apply transparency norms for such purposes,
their primary use in practice has been to impose stronger market
discipline on public spending, subordinating equity objectives to
the achievement of lower deficits and debt, and the promotion of
investment-friendly fiscal climates.
The formation of fiscal policy via the annual budget, and its
implementation through tax bills and other legislation, remains a
signature function of nation-state governments. Despite the
cross-border character of much economic activity and the
potential for transnational actors to avoid tax by shifting
investments or income among jurisdictions, international
coordination of substantive tax rules has proved challenging in
light of the complexity of national tax systems and the conflicting
interests of countries competing for investment and revenues. 13 2
In addition, market-friendly tax reforms have encountered
significant political resistance, especially in developing and
transition countries, leading reformers to retreat toward more
procedural types of "good governance" reform such as the
improvement of tax administration.'33 Recent initiatives to
132. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition,
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
133. See Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The
Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries 44 HARV.
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promote fiscal transparency internationally are an example of
this trend.
The issue of fiscal transparency began to attract wide
attention in the mid-1990s following a series of government
corruption scandals and financial crises in Asia and elsewhere.134
In addition, some commentators argued that improved
transparency rules would be preferable to hard fiscal limits such
as balanced budget and spending cap laws, which constrain
governments' flexibility to respond to changing economic
conditions and are highly susceptible to avoidance through
creative interpretation, accounting and forecasting.'35
New

Zealand enacted fiscal transparency legislation in

1994,136

followed by Australia'37 and the U.K.'3 8 in 1998. Recently, the

province of Ontario, Canada has replaced its balanced-budget
legislation with a new Fiscal Transparency and Accountability
Act. 139
The U.S. has so far failed to act upon IMF
recommendations that it enact fiscal transparency rules.14 °
International agencies have encouraged these developments
by promulgating formalized standards for fiscal transparency

and urging states to adopt these into their laws or budget
practices. 141 The IMF has been especially activist, publishing
INT'L L.J. 139, 171-85 (2003).

134. Murray Petrie, The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code: A Potentially
Powerful New Anti-Corruption Tool, paper prepared for the 9th International
Anti-Corruption Conference, (Durban, Oct. 1999).
135. See generally J.D. Foster & James C. Miller III, The Tyranny of Budget
Forecasts, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 205 (2000); ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Fiscal Sustainability: The
Contribution of Fiscal Rules, in 72 OECD ECON. OUTLOOK 126 (Nov. 2002);
Erik Peters, Report on the Review of the 2003-04 Fiscal Outlook 2 (October
29,
2003),
available
at
http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/english/erik
peters/PetersReport.pdf; Lisa C. Philipps, The Rise of BalancedBudget Laws in
Canada: Legislating Fiscal (Ir)responsibility, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 681
(1996).
136. Public Finance Act 1989, 1989 S.N.Z. No. 44, Part II, as amended by
Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, 1994 S.N.Z. No. 18.
137. Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 No. 22 (Austl.).
138. Finance Act, 1998, c.36, § 155 (U.K.).
139. Fiscal Transparency and Accountability Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 27
(Ontario, Can.) [hereinafter FTAA].
140. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, UNITED STATES: REPORT ON
OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES - FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (August
2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/crO3243.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2005).
141. See, e.g., OECD, OECD BEST PRACTICES FOR BUDGET
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dozens of reports on the extent to which individual countries
comply with its Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency
(IMF Code).'4 2 The stated purposes of the IMEF Code are to
enable "better-informed public debate about the design and

results of fiscal policy, make governments more accountable for
the implementation of fiscal policy, and thereby strengthen

credibility and public understanding of macroeconomic policies
and choices."' 4 3 It is positioned as part of the agency's larger
"good governance" initiative and is intended to "facilitate

surveillance of economic policies by country authorities,
financial markets, and international institutions." 1"

The IMF Code takes as its starting point the basic precepts
of liberal democratic government and the rule of law.

Thus,

countries are to have clear rules for the conduct of government
activities, its relationships with the private sector and with other
public institutions such as the central bank, and relationships
among different branches of government.145 Taxes should be
authorized explicitly by law, budget laws should govern the

expenditure of public funds, and public servants should be
governed by clear criteria for exercising administrative
discretion and by ethical standards of conduct. 46 The IMEF Code

then goes on to prescribe in some detail the types of information
that governments should disclose within their budget processes.

Several themes can be observed in the IMF's disclosure
standards. First, they seek to discourage concealment of
(May 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
33/13/1905258.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005); IMF, REVISED CODE OF GOOD
PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (Feb. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.pdf (last visited December 20,
2005). See also IMF, MANUAL ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (Mar. 23, 2001),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/manual.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2005), for discussion of individual IMF Code provisions.
142. See generally OECD BEST PRACTICES FOR BUDGET TRANSPARENCY,
supra note 141. These reports cover a wide range of countries from the most
industrialized to developing and transition economies. They are available at
http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
143. IMF, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency: Introduction
(Mar. 23, 2001), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm (last
visited Dec. 20, 2005).
144. Id.
145. IMF, REVISED CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY,
supra note 141, at § 1.1.
146. Id. at § 1.2; see also id. at § 3.3.
TRANSPARENCY
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liabilities or risks on the one hand, or assets on the other. For
example, budget documents are to cover not only central
government operations but the entire public sector (including,
for example, state owned agencies and enterprises) 147 and should
disclose any major fiscal risks, contingent liabilities, and tax
expenditures (that is, tax concessions to particular groups or
activities). 48 They must also disclose major fiscal aggregates
such as total debt, financial assets, revenues, expenditures,
49
borrowing, and the amount of any deficit or surplus.
A second theme of the IMF Code is to encourage critical
evaluation of fiscal performance.
Thus, governments are
required to state the objectives of their fiscal policy and then
report regularly on results achieved. 150 In particular, they must
assess the "sustainability" of their fiscal plans' and should
disclose fiscal performance for the previous two years and
projections for the two years following the budget. 2 The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has emphasized sustainability even more strongly than
the IMF, urging governments to produce a long-term budget
report that lays out "the budgetary implications of demographic
change, such as population ageing and other potential
developments over the long term (10-40 years)." 53 The reason
for promoting multi-year and long-term budgeting is "generally
to increase discipline over government expenditures," by
showing that current spending commitments will cost more in
54
the future and may be unsustainable in the longer term.
The final theme worth noting in the international codes is
their emphasis on ensuring the integrity of fiscal data. For
example, the IMF Code calls upon governments to state the
macroeconomic assumptions and accounting methods upon

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at §§ 2.1.1, 3.2.4.
Id. at §§ 2.1.3, 3.1.5.
See generally id. at § 3.2.
Id. at §§ 3.1.1, 3.2.2, 3.4.1, 3.4.3.
Id. at § 3.1.1.
Id. at § 2.1.2.
OECD, supra note 141, at § 1.7.

154. OECD, BUDGETING FOR THE FUTURE 6-8 (1997), available at
http://mekonginfo.orgHDP/Lib.nsf/0/75CC72E922DA50FF47256D820016EF3
5/$FILE/OECD%20-%2OBudgeting%20for%20the%2OFuture.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2005).
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which budgets are based 155 and to have government accounts and
fiscal data audited by independent bodies. 156 The OECD calls
57
specifically for a rigorously audited pre-election fiscal report.
The forms of transparency being promoted by these
international agencies are unobjectionable in themselves, at least
within a liberal framework of democratic accountability. Yet
they are also selective. They foreground certain measures of
fiscal openness and performance, in particular the need to
sustain a balanced budget, and remain conspicuously silent on
others. Most importantly, the international standards do not
require analysis or publication of data on the distributive
implications of the budget, the impact of fiscal policy on
different population sectors, on economic inequality, or on rates
of low income. Instead, they focus on aggregate measures such
as total revenue and total spending on programs, which tend to
obscure differences within the population. Further, they do not
require governments to engage in any particular form of public
consultation process or to disclose who participated in prebudget discussions with government officials. These omitted
aspects of transparency are likely of most relevance to
constituencies that are marginalized within the economy or
economic governance processes.
By contrast, the types of information flow promoted by the
international codes are of strong interest to relatively
empowered market actors. Indeed, the strategy underlying the
IMF initiative has been to strengthen market incentives for
budget transparency by informing lenders and investors about
the extent to which particular jurisdictions fall short of its
standards. 5 s While assessments are officially voluntary,'59
155. IMF, REVISED CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY,
supra note 141, at §§ 3.1.3, 4.1.2.
156. Id. at § 4.2.
157. OECD, supra note 141, at § 1.6.
158. See MURRAY PETRIE, IMF WORKING PAPER, PROMOTING FISCAL
TRANSPARENCY: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF THE IMF, FINANCIAL
MARKETS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 3-4, 6 (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wpO3199.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
159. IMF, MANUAL ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY, supra note 141, at 2. The
IMF website further states that "[r]eports summarizing countries' observance
of these standards are prepared and published at the request of the member
country." IMF, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs),
at www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
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countries seeking better access to international capital markets
or other economic opportunities such as accession to the
European Union, are under pressure to invite this form of
monitoring. 60 The IMF recently surveyed major institutional
lenders, investment banks, and credit rating agencies and found
that its fiscal transparency reports are in fact relied upon by
many private sector analysts, especially in the U.S., to gauge
country risk and guide investment decisions.16 Based on these
results, an IMF Working Paper recommended ways the IMF
162
Code could be made more useful to these audiences.
It also noted that pension fund managers and private
consultants have adapted the IMF Code to conduct their own
risk assessments in jurisdictions where the IMF has not yet
reported. 63 This example nicely illustrates a point made earlier
in the paper about the fluid nature of the public/private
distinction that historically has limited citizenship claims within
the economic realm.
While Petrie characterizes fiscal
transparency standards to be an "international public good, '' 16
clearly they are being designed in tandem with the private
sector, in large part to suit its needs.
Interestingly, the survey also consulted civil society
organizations about their use of IMF fiscal transparency reports.
It found that while a few non-governmental organizations are
pursuing issues of budget transparency, they either have not
utilized the IMF Code or have found it necessary to augment it
with standards concerning the degree of citizen participation in
budget processes. 165 This result was viewed as unsurprising
because "the [IMF] has not actively publicized [the Code]
among civil society groups, the content and language in fiscal
[reports] is highly technical, and the [IMF] may be regarded as
an unlikely source of such information. '1 66 These findings

160. See generally WILLIAM ALLAN & TARYN PARRY, IMF WORKING
PAPER, FISCAL TRANSPARENCY IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES: PROGRESS AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
wp/2003/wp03163.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,2005).
161. See generally Petrie, supra note 158.
162. See id. at 14-16, 22-24.
163. See id. at 8.
164. Id. at 14,21.
165. See id. at 16-21.
166. Id. at 19.
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illuminate both the partiality of existing fiscal transparency
norms and the possibility of rethinking them to address a wider
array of interests.
Some of the fiscal transparency laws enacted at the
domestic level take modest steps in this direction. For example
Ontario's Fiscal Transparency and Accountability Act requires
the government to publicize information on pre-budget
consultations with the public, including key issues to be
addressed in the next budget, and information on how to
participate.167 In addition, the Ontario law gives some space to
equity concerns by stating that the principles of responsibility,
flexibility, equity, and transparency are to govern fiscal policy in
the province.161 The U.K. Code for Fiscal Stability establishes
five such principles: 169transparency, stability, responsibility,
fairness, and efficiency.
It must be noted, however, that both jurisdictions have
placed a generational spin on the meaning of equity for these
purposes. In the U.K., "fairness" is defined to mean that "so far
as reasonably practicable, the Government shall seek to operate
fiscal policy in a way that takes into account the financial effects
on future generations, as well as its distributional impact on the
current population.""17 Ontario defines "equity" to mean that
the "impact on different groups within the population and on
' These phrases echo
future generations should be considered."171
the sustainability concerns of the international codes, linking the
concept of equity back to the need for fiscal discipline. They
draw implicitly on the concept of "generational accounting," a
method of fiscal policy analysis in which expenses and revenues
are projected out over the very long term and allocated among
different age groups within the population.'72 The OECD has
lauded this methodology, claiming it will show that in most of its
member countries "a continuation of current tax and spending
policies generally implies that present generations are living at

167. FTAA, supra note 139, at c. 27, § 6(2).
168. Id. at § 2 (emphasis added).
169. Finance Act, 1998, c.36, § 155(2) (U.K.) (emphasis added).
170. Code for Fiscal Stability 4 (U.K.), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/media/160/7C/fiscal-stability.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
171. FTAA, supra note 139, at § 2.
172. OECD, supra note 151, at 13-18.
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the expense of future generations .

,,173

Thus, generational

accounting is presented as a means of building political
consensus around the need for social spending restraint.174
It is also significant that neither Ontario nor the U.K.
mandates disclosure of any concrete information on the
achievement of equity or fairness objectives. Both set out
detailed requirements for reporting of updated data on fiscal
aggregates, including multi-year comparisons and projections, on
a prescribed schedule throughout -the year. However, none of
these requirements address distributive concerns directly, nor
will they be of much use to government or civil society analysts
interested in this dimension. In particular, fiscal transparency
laws do little to encourage analysis of the gender impacts of
budgetary decisions.
Feminist political economists have been at the forefront of
research on the gendered assumptions and effects of fiscal
policy. They have argued that the gender blindness of
mainstream economic analysis has resulted in policies that are
not only inequitable but inefficient, often undermining the
achievement of governments' own stated objectives.175 While a

full discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of the
current paper, two of its central insights are directly relevant to
our critique of prevailing norms of fiscal transparency. The first
is that aggregate economic and fiscal data fail to capture crucial
differences in the position of men and women in the economy,
for example in terms of their paid labor force participation, the
levels of income they derive from different sources, the amount
and type of taxes they pay, and the extent to which they access
different public services and benefits.'76

Accordingly, the

gendered implications of a change in the tax mix or in program
spending will be obscured from view unless policy makers and
173. Id. at 13.
174. See id. at 18.
175. See, e.g., ISABELLA BAKKER & DIANE ELSON, Towards Engendering
Budgets, in ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL BUDGET PAPERS (1998); Diane Elson, The
Economic, the Politicaland the Domestic: Businesses, States and Households in
the Organisationof Production,3 NEW POL. ECON. 189 (1998); NANCY FOLBRE,
THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES (2000).
176. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARNETT & CAREN GROWN, GENDER IMPACTS OF
GOVERNMENT REVENUE COLLECTION: THE CASE OF TAXATION (2004); Martha

MacDonald, Gender and Social Security Policy: Pitfalls and Possibilities, 4
FEMINIST ECON. 1

(1998).
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the public have access to gender disaggregated data and analysis.
The second key insight from feminist political economy is
that economic policy should take into account the household
sector, not only as a consumer of goods produced by the private
market and the state, but as a producer in its own right supplying
essential inputs to the other sectors. 7 7 Budget documents
generally account only for costs and revenues that are
monetized, an approach that implicitly treats unpaid labor as a
kind of inexhaustible natural resource that can be drawn down
as needed to produce a functioning labor force and to maintain
the social framework for economic activity. Thus, a balanced
budget ostensibly can be achieved simply by shifting costs away
from the state to the household sector, where they are treated as
free. This approach hides the costs imposed on households,
primarily on women, in the form of lost opportunities for income
generation as well as the out-of-pocket costs of caregiving. It
also fails to recognize that the supply of women's unpaid labor
has limits and cannot be extended infinitely without the
investment of budgetary resources in household supports.
Indeed, Palmer has argued that offloading responsibilities to
families and communities imposes a highly non-transparent tax
on women, in the form of additional unpaid work they must
perform before they can access the labor market.178 It must be
recognized that despite much common ground, there is no one
settled vision of the ideal economic order in this literature.
Feminists continue to struggle with how to balance the pursuit of
market access with the valuation of caregiving work, and to
question whether market
relations could be transformed along
179
more cooperative lines.
These insights have been applied in a number of policy
projects on gender-responsive budgeting (GRB). These have
177. See, e.g., Isabella

BAKKER, UNPAID WORK AND MACROECONOMICS:

NEW DISCUSSIONS, NEW TOOLS FOR ACTION (1998); Lourdes Beneria, Toward

Greater Integration of Gender in Economics, 23 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1839
(1995); Maria Sagrario Floro, Economic Restructuring, Gender and the
Allocation of Time, 23 WORLD DEV. 1913 (1995).
178. See Ingrid Palmer, Public Finance from a Gender Perspective, 23
WORLD DEV. 1981 (1995).
179. See Lourdes Beneria, The Enduring Debate over Unpaid Labour, 138
INT'L LABOUR REV. 287 (1999); Jenny Cameron & J.K. Gibson-Graham,
Feminising the Economy: Metaphors, Strategies, Politics, 10 GENDER, PLACE &
CULTURE 145 (2003); Lister, supra note 55.
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sometimes been conducted by feminist NGOs providing
commentary or advice to government policy makers, while in
other cases governments have integrated GRB into their internal
budgeting processes.'
At the international level, the
Commonwealth Secretariat has coordinated a major initiative on
GRB, advocating and providing practical advice to member

governments interested in applying it in their own budget
processes."' One experienced GRB advocate has observed that

these projects must negotiate a tension between the views of
expert feminists who have relevant academic or policy training,
and those of grassroots organizers who tend to have a more
pragmatic view of what constitutes meaningful change in the
interests of women. 182
The GRB movement serves as one example of an attempt
to construct alternatives to a dominant neoliberal version of
economic citizenship, and illustrates some of the challenges
involved in such an exercise. There is scope for feminist legal
theory to make a contribution here by connecting the insights of
GRB to a concrete analysis of international standards and laws
relating to fiscal transparency. There is already a substantial
body of feminist scholarship on the domestic taxation laws of
various nations.'83 Some of this literature has foregrounded the
180. See ISABELLA BAKKER,
CANADIAN
CENTRE
FOR
POLICY
ALTERNATIVES, GENDER BUDGET INITIATIVES: WHY THEY MATTER IN
CANADA (2005); ISABELLA BAKKER, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM, FISCAL POLICY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND VOICE: THE EXAMPLE OF
GENDER RESPONSIVE BUDGETING INITIATIVES (2002), available at http://hdr.
undp.org/docs/publications/background-papers/2002/Bakker_.2002.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2005); GENDER BUDGETS MAKE MORE CENTS: COUNTRY
STUDIES AND GOOD PRACTICE (Debbie Budlender & Guy Hewitt eds., 2002)
[hereinafter GENDER BUDGETS MAKE MORE CENTS]; Helena Hofbauer,
Gender-Sensitive Budget Analysis: A Tool to Promote Women's Rights, 14 CAN.
J.WOMEN & L. 98 (2002).
181. See generally GENDER BUDGETS MAKE MORE CENTS, supra note 180;
Diane Elson, Gender Budget Initiative: Background Papers (1999), available at
http://www.gender-budgets.org/uploads/user-S/l1271663631DianeElson_GenderBudgetInitiative-_BackgroundPapers.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2005).
182. See Donna St. Hill, United Kingdom: A Focus on Taxes and Benefits, in
GENDER BUDGETS MAKE MORE CENTS, supra note 180.
183. The bulk of this scholarship has so far been produced in the U.S.,
Canada, and Australia. For a sampling, see the articles published in the
symposium Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy, in 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. (1997), as well as the symposium on critical tax
theory in 76 N.C. L. REV. 1519-888 (1998); see also Judith Grbich, The Tax Unit
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interaction of gender with race, class, sexuality, disability, and
age in shaping the implicit assumptions and the impact of tax
rules. 184 However, with few exceptions, the connections between
globalization and fiscal policy have not yet been considered from
a feminist perspective.1 85 This case study suggests that fiscal
transparency codes may provide one entry place for such work.
CONCLUSION

This discussion of feminist legal theory's potential
contribution to discussions of transnational economic
governance leads us to three concluding observations. First, the
two case studies side by side demonstrate that the state plays a
different role in each, with different opportunities for feminist
intervention.

The state's role is less contested in fiscal policy

than it is in securities regulation, though we have also shown that
states may be more or less sovereign over their fiscal choices
depending on their position within international capital markets.
Debate Revisited: Notes on the Critical Resources of a Feminist Revenue Law
Scholarship, 4 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 512 (1991); Marjorie Kornhauser, The
Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86
MICH. L. REv. 465 (1987); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997);
Lisa C. Philipps, Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of
Technical Knowledge in Fiscal Law and Policy, 11 CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 141
(1996); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996);
Miranda Stewart, Domesticating Tax Reform: The Family in Australian Tax
and Transfer Reform, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 453 (1999).
184. See, e.g., TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows
eds., 1996); Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue
Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000); Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking The Tax
Code: A Case Study of Employment-Related Child-CareExpenditures, 10 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1998); Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black
Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, Wis. L. REV. 751 (1996); Lisa C.
Philipps, Disability, Poverty and the Income Tax: The Case for Refundable
Credits, 16 J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 77 (2001); Claire F. L. Young, Taxing Times for
Lesbians and Gay Men: Equality at What Cost?, 17 DALHOUSIE L.J. 534 (1994);
Claire F.L. Young, (In)visible Inequalities: Women, Tax and Poverty, 27
OTTAWA L. REV. 99 (1995).
185. Stewart and Jogarajan take some initial steps toward such a project:
Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and
Tax Reform, 2 BRITISH TAX REV. 146, 165-66 (2004); see also Karen Brown's
work on U.S. tax policy toward developing countries which addresses issues of
racialized economic inequity: Karen B. Brown, Transforming the Unilateralist
into the Internationalist:New Tax Treaty Policy toward Developing Countries,
in TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996);
Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules
Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries? 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
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These contrasts highlight the need for feminist legal theory to
take a fine-grained approach that considers the specific dynamics
and constituencies at play in different areas of economic
governance, rather than attempting to resolve in universal terms
questions about the role of the state versus private or
international institutions in bringing about reforms.
A second contribution is that the paper confirms the need
for feminist legal theory to take a broad view of 'law' as it works
to apply its insights in the context of economic globalization. In
particular it must search out at the supra-national level the
informal instruments and quasi-public institutions that are
shaping economic law at the level of individual states. These are
now part of the essential context for understanding legal
developments within individual countries and sub-national
jurisdictions. Finally, the paper demonstrates that looking at the
international level can reveal areas of potential common interest
among women in multiple countries, but also calls for clear
sightedness about the different and sometimes conflicting
interests of women in various national, cultural, and class
locations. There is obviously a continuing role for work that
focuses on specific legal issues in a single jurisdiction. However,
the methodologies and assumptions of such work should now be
changing to incorporate a new consciousness about the intrinsic
links and tensions between Western gender equality projects and
the preoccupations and material situation of women elsewhere.
This lesson may be especially salient for feminist work in the
area of economic governance, where domestic legal
developments are increasingly driven by the pressures and
opportunities of globally-integrated markets.

